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CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF A SUBROGATION
AGREEMENT PREVENTS TORTFEASOR'S DEFENSE
BASED ON A GENERAL RELEASE
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gerson
113 Ohio App. 321,17 Ohio Op. 2d 333, 177 N.E.2d 790 (1960)
The insured's automobile, which was insured by a $50 deductible colli-
sion policy with the plaintiff, was involved in a collision with a truck driven
by the defendant. Plaintiff paid its insured $119.61 and entered into a subro-
gation agreement with him on August 14, 1958. At some time thereafter,
defendant's insurer visited plaintiff's insured and obtained a general release
of all claims against defendant for a consideration of $50. Plaintiff brought
an action for the amount of its subrogated claim. The trial court found that
the defendant was negligent, but held for the defendant because of the
general release given by plaintiff's insured. The court of appeals reversed
and entered final judgment for plaintiff, holding that defendant, by inference,
had knowledge of the subrogation agreement between plaintiff and its insured
when the release was obtained. Therefore, the release would not bar a re-
covery by plaintiff.'
The rule announced by the court is considered the orthodox rule of in-
surance law,2 but apparently the problem had not previously arisen in Ohio.
3
A similar rule has, however, long been applied to assignments of debts where
the debtor, with knowledge of an assignment by his creditor, pays the debt
to the original creditor and then attempted to assert the payment as a de-
fense against the assignee. 4 Knowledge on the part of the tortfeasor, or the
debtor, of a subrogation agreement or assignment is the key to the application
of the rule in either situation. In the absence of such knowledge the tort-
feasor or debtor should have the right to settle with an injured person or pay
a creditor without fear of being required to pay a second time to a subrogee
or assignee whose existence is unknown to him.
The problem presented in the principal case may easily arise under
collision insurance contracts, which normally contain deductibility clauses.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dye,5 decided one month after the principal case,
an insurer sued its insured to recover back the amount which it had paid to
the insured under an insurance contract having a $50 deductible clause. The
defendant insured had given the tortfeasor a general release, without re-
1 Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gerson, 113 Ohio App. 321, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 333, 177
N.E.2d 790 (1960).
2 Vance, Insurance § 134 (3d ed. 1951); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 699 n.3 (1957); Annot.,
105 A.L.R. 1433 (1936); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 1455 (1928).
3 See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gerson, supra note 1, at 323, 17 Ohio Op. 2d at 334,
177 N.E.2d at 792.
4 P.C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Volkert, 58 Ohio St. 362 (1898); Fire Ass'n v. State
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 135 (Ct. App. 1938); Restatement, Contracts § 170
(1932).
5 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dye, 113 Ohio App. 90, 170 N.E.2d 862 (1960).
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serving plaintiff insurer's right of subrogation, before receiving payment
under the policy from plaintiff. Plaintiff later paid the amount of the prop-
erty damage, less $50, to defendant insured, without knowledge of the settle-
ment and release. In his answer, defendant denied that he had compromised
any portion of plaintiff's subrogation claim. The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that
there was no dispute that defendant had settled his entire claim against the
tortfeasor by giving him a full release without any reservation of plaintiff's
right to seek reimbursement against the tortfeasor under its subrogation
agreement. The court of appeals stated that even if the defendant insured
had notified the tortfeasor of his pending claim with plaintiff insurer, plain-
tiff could still recover, since defendant would have prejudiced plaintiff's rights
against the tortfeasor. The court made it clear, however, that if the tort-
feasor had been notified of payment and a subrogation agreement, the insurer
could not recover from its insured, since in that event its right of subrogation
would not be impaired. Other jurisdictions have likewise held that where the
tortfeasor obtains a release from the insured without knowledge of a prior
subrogation agreement, the subrogated insurer cannot recover in a suit
against the tortfeasor.6
The principal case and Dye are quite consistent. Both require knowl-
edge by the tortfeasor of the subrogation agreement as a condition precedent
to recovery by the insurer where the insured has given an unqualified release
to the tortfeasor. The significance of the principal case is the manner in
which the court established knowledge of the subrogation on the part of the
tortfeasor. No evidence was presented to show that .the tortfeasor had actual
knowledge of the subrogation agreement or actual knowledge that the insured
was covered by collision insurance. However, the court drew an inference of
such knowledge from the following facts: (1) The $50 received by the in-
sured was paid by an insurance agent representing the tortfeasor; (2) From
observing the insured's automobile after the accident, the tortfeasor must
have known that the insured suffered more than $50 damage; and (3) $50
was the exact amount of the deductible portion of the collision policy.
Subrogated insurance companies are now protected to some extent by
the adoption of the rule in the principal case in situations where the insured
has given a release but has received nothing in excess of his loss as considera-
tion,7 provided that the tortfeasor has at least constructive knowledge of the
subrogation. In Pacific Fire Insurance Co. v. Wyatt,s the insurer brought an
action against its insured to recover the amount paid under the policy. The
insured had executed a full release to the tortfeasor in consideration of a sum
of money paid for the damages in excess of the amount paid by the insurer,
6 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 122 Kan. 445, 252 Pac. 215 (1927). See also
authorities cited note 2 supra.
7 Casualty Co. v. Rees Co., 71 Ohio App. 361, 50 N.E.2d 347 (1942); Pacific Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wyatt, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 336, 49 N.E.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1940). But see Nor-
wich Union Fire Ins. Soc. v. Stang, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 464, 9 Ohio C.C. Dec. 576 (1899).
8 35 Ohio L. Abs. 336,40 N.E.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1940).
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the release having been given after the payment under the policy by plaintiff
insurer to defendant insured. The court held that the insurer could not re-
cover since the insured had received only that to which he was entitled. The
principal case would seemingly allow the insurer to recover from the tort-
feasor in a situation similar to that in Wyatt if he can show constructive
knowledge by the tortfeasor of a subrogation agreement when the release was
obtained. The proof of such knowledge is greatly facilitated by the inferences
drawn in the principal case. This is especially true where the amount re-
ceived from the tortfeasor is only a small fraction of the total damage suffered
by the insured.
The release problem was probably a source of confusion in Hoosier
Casualty Co. v. Davis,9 decided subsequent to the principal case. In Hoosier
Casualty the insured had previously filed suit against the tortfeasor for per-
sonal injuries. Prior to trial the claim was settled, and the suit was accor-
dingly dismissed with prejudice. The subrogated insurer then brought suit
against the tortfeasor to recover that portion of the property damages which
it had paid to its insured. In its answer, as a second defense (there were
actually two separate and distinct defenses, release and res judicata), defend-
ant alleged the commencement of the personal injury action, the settlement
and dismissal with prejudice, and further alleged that insured had executed
a release of all claims in favor of the tortfeasor. The plaintiff insurer appar-
ently did not move to require the defendant to separately state and number
the two defenses in the so-called second defense but did file a reply denying
the release for want of information, and alleging notification to the tortfeasor,
prior to the commencement of the personal injury action, of the extent of
payment made to insured by plaintiff insurer. The trial court sustained de-
fendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, but the Supreme Court of
Ohio ultimately reversed. The opinion of the court failed to note the presence
of the two distinct defenses of release and res judicata, and accordingly
failed to deal explicitly with either defense. The defense of release should
have been disposed of on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff denied the release in its
reply, and (2) Plaintiff avoided the release in its reply alleging that it gave
notice of the subrogation agreement to the tortfeasor prior to the commence-
ment of the personal injury action. This allegation amounted to an avoidance
of the defense of release because of the basic principle referred to previously
that payment to a creditor (or compromise with a tort claimant) by a debtor
(or tortfeasor) with knowledge of a previous assignment (or subrogation) is
no defense to a subsequent action by an assignee (or subrogee). Either the
denial or the avoidance in the reply would have prevented affirmance of the
judgment on the pleadings on the basis of the release defense. With the re-
lease defense thus eliminated from consideration as a possible justification
for affirming the judgment on the pleadings, the court might have made a
more satisfactory analysis of the defense of res judicata. Although the result
reached by the court was correct, its opinion fails to state any general princi-
ple upon which its holding is based. To some extent the concurring opinion
9 172 Ohio St. 5, 173 N.E.2d 349 (1961), noted, 22 Ohio St. LJ. 763 (1961).
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of Taft, J., supplies the omission by pointing out that failure of the tortfeasor
to object to the nonjoinder of a subrogor or subrogee constitutes a waiver of
such nonjoinder. (Such failure to object might also be said to amount to a
consent by the tortfeasor to the maintenance of two actions against him upon
the same cause of action.) However, even the concurring opinion blurs the
distinction between the defense of release and the defense of res judicata.
Although the concurring opinion is obviously directed toward the defense of
res judicata, it cites as its basis the decision in Railway Co. v. Volkert.10
That case involved the defense of payment to a partial assignor. It did not
involve in any way the defense of res judicata.
It is apparent from the result of the principal case that a release ob-
tained by the tortfeasor's liability insurer, the consideration being the amount
of the deductible portion of a collision policy, will usually not bar an action
by the insurer against the tortfeasor since knowledge of the subrogation
agreement on the part of the tortfeasor's liability insurer will ordinarily be
inferred by the court. It appears possible that such an inference could also
be drawn in a case where the consideration for the release is only slightly
more than the deductible portion of the collision policy. While the rule
established by the principal case is new in Ohio, it evidences a policy that
has existed elsewhere for a long period of time." The rule enforces a higher
ethical standard on the representatives of liability insurance companies. A
contrary holding would have condoned attempts by such representatives to
defeat subrogation rights by payment to an insured of the unsubrogated por-
tion of a claim. On the other hand, while the subrogated insurer prevailed in
the present case, as a matter of self-protection a collision insurer should make
every effort to give immediate notice to the tortfeasor of the insurer's right
of subrogation.12
10 58 Ohio St. 362 (1898).
11 See authorities cited note 4 supra.
12 As was allegedly done in Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Davis, supra note 9.
